Between Adorno and HIP: Possibilities of Synthesis by Pace, I.
Pace, I. (2008). Between Adorno and HIP: Possibilities of Synthesis. Paper presented at the 
Adorno and Musical Reproduction Conference, 13-09-2008 - 14-09-2008, Manchester, UK. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Pace, I. (2008). Between Adorno and HIP: Possibilities of Synthesis. Paper 
presented at the Adorno and Musical Reproduction Conference, 13-09-2008 - 14-09-2008, 
Manchester, UK. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/6470/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Between Adorno and HIP: Possibilities of Synthesis 
Ian Pace 
 
Lecture, Adorno and Musical Reproduction Conference, Royal Northern College 
of Music, September 14th, 2008 
 
For a long time, in the English-speaking world, Adorno has been viewed as probably 
the first major opponent to Historically Informed Performance, or HIP, a coruscating 
adversary towards the plethora of instrumental and stylistic practices that has 
accompanied this movement. This perception has its roots above all in the one essay 
dealing in part with performance that has been available in English for a substantial 
period, ‘Bach Defended against his Devotees’, the later sections of which specifically 
alludes to then relatively new approaches to the performance of Bach’s music. 
 
This Adorno essay remains significant, and its concepts and arguments are not 
necessarily negated by the rest of Adorno’s output – including Towards a Theory of 
Musical Reproduction [TTMR] – but its foundations and implications need to be 
further investigated in the context of this paper. Adorno wrote this essay in 1951 as a 
response to constructions of Bach that occurred in 1950, as part of the bicentennial of 
Bach’s death. In West Germany, the organisers of the Bach celebrations (who 
included Friedrich Blume, a musicologist deeply complicit with Nazi ideology) 
presented a particular view of Bach’s work, owing a good deal to the ideas of Albert 
Schweitzer. By this view, the religiosity, mysticism, fixation upon death and supposed 
conservatism of Bach were emphasised, in stark opposition to attempts in East 
Germany to portray Bach in that mixture of nationalism and Stalinist communism that 
so characterised the official culture: Bach was an authentic voice to be held up against 
capitalism and American imperialism, and whose work had been distorted by pro-
religious and formalist criticism1. Adorno rejected the view of Bach as backward-
looking or as a passive conveyor of religious ideology, drawing attention instead to 
the immanent logic of the musical material in Bach’s work, which existed in a 
dialectical (rather than purely subservient) relationship to the formal, stylistic and 
generic models which it inhabited. In no sense was Bach a ‘restorative’ composer, but 
rather one who employed the possibilities bequeathed by the most advanced musical 
language of his time within archaic forms, thus creating a unique form of inner 
tension. As he said, ‘it is precisely the archaic-sounding pieces which are often the 
most daring, not merely in terms of their contrapuntal combinations, which indeed 
draw directly on the earlier polyphonic arrangements, but also with regard to the most 
advanced aspects of the general effect’2. However, certain modes of performance, 
those which aim to recreate historical conditions and practice, mitigate against the 
articulation of these vital elements. Referring to what Adorno believes to be ‘an 
irresistible crescendo’  in the C# minor triple fugue on Book 1 of Bach’s Well-
Tempered Clavier, with climaxes ‘with the mighty explosion of the man theme 
entering in the bass, the most extreme concentration of a pseudo-ten voice stretto and 
the turning point of a heavily accented dissonance, in order then to vanish as though 
through a dark portal’, he argues that the inability to produce dynamic contrast on the 
organ or harpsichord makes it impossible to render ‘the basic dynamism of the 
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compositional structure itself’ then, interestingly appeals not so much to the 
composer’s intention in arguing for the use of the later instrument with the power to 
vary dynamics, but to the ‘intrinsic nature’ of the work, with ‘the objective law 
peculiar to it’ which he claims need not coincide with ‘the conception that a composer 
has of his music’3. 
 
Adorno goes on to launch his polemic against the performance of Bach ‘under the 
unholy star of Historicism’. And it is this passage which was perhaps most 
fundamental influential on the development of the ideas on performance by Richard 
Taruskin, who cites Adorno very briefly in his essay ‘The Pastness of the Present and 
the Presence of the Past’4, but whose indebtedness to Adorno’s ideas both here and 
elsewhere is stronger than he would like to admit. The ‘historicism’ that Adorno 
decries was rooted in the ‘Bach to Bach’ movement of the 1920s, manifested through 
aesthetics of neo-classicism and the Neue Sachlichkeit, appealing to Bach’s supposed 
objectivism in opposition to pre-First World War late romanticism. This wide-ranging 
aesthetic movement encompassed many composers of the time, including Stravinsky 
and Hindemith, the neo-classicist phase of Schoenberg’s early atonal music, all of 
which Adorno criticised strongly elsewhere, and younger figures such as Wolfgang 
Fortner, who soon afterwards went on to be a full member of the Nazi Party. 
 
Adorno contrasts the book-keeping like priorities of the historicists, concerned ‘to see 
that no inauthentic dynamics, modifications of tempo, oversize choirs and orchestras 
creep in’, with the possibility that ‘any more humane impulse become audible in the 
rendition’, for which ‘they seem to wait with potential fury’5. Similarly Taruskin, 
linking such an aesthetic to wider artistic and intellectual figures including Ortega y 
Gasset and Ezra Pound – as well as drawing attention to Pound’s relationship with 
Arnold Dolmetsch, pioneer in the re-introduction of early instruments -  argues that 
what purports to be a performance style rooted in antiquity is actually an expression 
of modernist aesthetics – a claim he goes on in this and various other essays to 
substantiate by examining the ways in which various historical data on performance is 
disregarded when it does not concur with the objectivist ethos – most notably that 
concerning embellishment, ornamentation and other manifestations of performer 
freedom. 
 
The post-war historically-informed performance had hardly got off the ground at the 
time Adorno wrote his essay; it was an interwar movement and its musicological 
advocates that he had mind. By the time of Taruskin’s important writings on 
performance, most of which date from between the early 1980s and early 1990s, the 
movement had developed extensively, especially in Britain and the Netherlands. And 
Taruskin also linked this movement to the objectivism of earlier figures such as 
Toscanini and – and this is something which should be borne in mind in light of 
Taruskin’s later fanatically anti-German polemics – he argues somewhat 
disparagingly that all such figures evince an anti-German bias, specifically in terms of 
Germanic traditions of high expressiveness as manifested in particular by Wagner but 
going back at least to Beethoven, and the tradition of the sublime, and continued by 
such conductors as Karajan, long the bete noire of historically-informed performance. 
For Taruskin the contrast is between a cathedral and a skyscraper on of various 
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dualisms he creates through the course of the essays collected in the volume Text and 
Act, variously contrasting the ‘geometric’ with the ‘vitalist’, modernism with 
romanticism, or even a post-modern ‘reassertion of consumer values’ against ‘the 
culture of the museum’6.  
 
Adorno’s polemic is marred by, amongst other things, his extremely cavalier 
dismissal of the idea that instrumental timbre was of any consequence during the 
baroque period, but he is at his most incisive when associating objectivist Bach with 
‘the sphere of resentment and obscuritanism, the triumph of the subjectless over 
subjectivism’7. This type of argument is entirely consistent with Adorno’s writings 
from the same period on the authoritarian personality, one who derives reassurance 
and repairs ego-weakness by submission to higher impersonalised authority – a 
phenomenon which was obviously linked to then only recently defeated fascism in 
music. Adorno’s diagnosis in terms of de-subjectivisation, de-humanisation, and 
submission to authority (as well as to pseudo-archaisms, idealised views of a mythical 
past removed from the realm of history as process, whether in the form of imaginary 
medieval communities, folk music and culture, or an ideal of baroque music and 
society) link his critiques of objectivist Bach performance, of Stravinsky, and of 
Wagner, as well of the tendencies towards total rationalisation of the compositional 
process in early 1950s modernism that Adorno critiqued in his essay ‘The Ageing of 
the New Music’. To my mind, one of his most brilliant manoeuvres was to reveal 
similar de-subjectivising processes at play in both Wagner and Stravinsky, two 
composers previously assumed to represent polar opposites. In both cases the 
possibilities of self-reflexive subjectivity are supplanted by something more akin to 
Max Weber’s model of charismatic authority. Both cast themselves in the role of 
manipulators of their audience, creating a mystical aura around a construction of 
personality which may not overlap in any way with their own more inwardly-directed 
consciousness.  
 
If there is an overridingly consistent strain throughout Adorno’s output, it concerns 
the dissolution of the human subject in the face of total rationalisation of society, a 
process that occurs under fascism, Stalinism and late capitalism alike, though the 
precise manifestations take on different forms. Charismatic authority is no less de-
subjectivising than anything else, and is at the root of aristocratic identity, which itself 
requires at least in public an impression of aloofness and mysticism in order to 
emphasise its own difference from the identities of the non-aristocratic public, and 
thus legitimate the power it wields. This model can be found in Wagner and 
Stravinsky, and is not incompatible with objectivism, as Stravinsky demonstrates, 
though it is possible for seemingly objective forces to wield power without requiring a 
visible human personality as their representative – communist bureaucracy (which 
was also capable of functioning without the charismatic leadership of a figure like 
Stalin) and the impersonal face of capitalist institutions demonstrate that even that last 
manifestation of something resembling a human being can be erased, and the system 
can appear to operate purely according to its own logic and momentum, against which 
human resistance is futile.  
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Taruskin’s diagnosis is not couched in such grandiose historical terms, deriving from 
Hegel, Marx and psychoanalysis; rather, his narrative reflects the perspective of an 
American liberal, with all the inner contradictions this entails. And nowhere is the 
difference more apparent than in the variety of expressive possibility that he contrasts 
favourably with objectivist tendencies in performance. Adorno sees in such 
objectivism the antithesis of the form of individualised, unsubservient subjectivity of 
the early bourgeois era, manifested above all in Beethoven’s middle period, which 
struggles for survival in the face of the rationalising tendencies of late capitalism. It is 
a subjectivity of the musician as producer, one no longer constrained by the demands 
of feudal servitude – in this sense a radical break with 18th-century Affektionslehre, as 
Carl Dahlhaus points out8 - only to find itself confronted with a new form of servitude 
provided by the encroachments of an ever-more powerful culture industry. In the 
specific context of performance, the move towards objectivist renditions of Bach 
reflect a culture and society increasingly distrustful of the advanced subjectivity that 
Adorno identifies in Bach’s music – as practically the only composer before 
Beethoven in whom he finds radical bourgeois subjectivity foreshadowed. But it is 
surprising that Adorno does not seem, at least not in any pronounced manner, to 
extend the virtues of this type of subjectivity to the performer, whom he casts very 
much in a secondary role relative to the composer. Objectivist performance is suspect 
not because it disallows the performer the possibility of bringing their own unique 
individual subjectivity to bear upon the performance, but because it overrides the 
complex manifestations of subjectivity that are evidenced in the composition itself, 
through the imposition of strict hierarchies that relegate all the complex, sometimes 
tortuous, inner logic of the work, as manifested through specific harmonic and 
contrapuntal procedures, to a purely decorative role, in the name of creating a self-
contained musical object whose possible wider implications, social and otherwise, can 
be absorbed within its own hermetically sealed boundaries.  
 
Taruskin, however, is ultimately no more on the side of individualistic performance, 
despite certain rather half-baked attempts to suggest that he might be (for example 
when favouring ‘crooked’ over ‘straight’ performances). This, I would argue, is a 
direct result of his non-Marxist model which instead reflects the ideologies of 
American consumer capitalism. As mentioned earlier, Taruskin, on repeated 
occasions, appeals to the supposed wishes, desires and aspirations of the listener as 
consumer of music, and to expression framed in terms of the reactions it invokes in 
the listener, prioritising these over the subjective wishes of the musical producer 
whether as composer or performer. This view becomes a recurrent motif in his later 
work, especially throughout the Oxford History of Western Music, ruthlessly 
interrogating music history, in the name of a questionable appeal to egalitarianism and 
non-elitism, for those composers in whom he can find evidence of a trait he deplores, 
that of stubbornly following their own musical desires as opposed to assuming their 
rightful modest position as servants of listeners. The position Taruskin deplores he 
associates primarily with the aesthetics of German romanticism – with the type of 
radical bourgeois subjectivity so highly privileged by Adorno – though he identifies 
traces of the same phenomenon in wider times and places, as far back as Josquin or 
even the troubadours, which somewhat undermines what I would identify as his 
strategy to isolate Germany as the source of all that is bad in music – with this in mind 
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I would suggest that the Oxford History could be retitled ‘Germanism in Music’, with 
all that such a Wagnerian allusion entails. 
 
So Taruskin’s antithesis to objectivist tendencies in performance return to the 
aesthetics of Affektionslehre, to pre-Beethovenian subjectivity reinvented according to 
the demands of the culture industry whose very nature he never seriously questions, in 
common with other New Musicologists whose hostility to established non-
commercial musical institutions leaves them in the unenviable position of becoming 
advocates for market-driven musical production. As a critique of objectivist 
performance, though, he is forced to appeal to a presumption of what listeners as 
consumers supposedly want, rather arrogantly assuming the mantle of their 
spokesperson. But, as John Butt has pointed out in his book Playing with History, 
Taruskin’s consumerist claims are fundamentally undermined simply by the very 
commercial success of the historically-informed performance movement – as Butt 
puts it, someone must have bought all of those recordings of Christopher Hogwood9. 
 
But Taruskin elsewhere makes the claim that ‘virtually all important artistic 
movements since Romanticism (including, of course, our authenticity movement) 
have shared in this contempt for the public as arbiter of taste, whatever their 
differences may otherwise have been’10, thus claiming a significant commonality 
between the variety of modernist objectivism he identifies and Beethovenian 
subjectivity, once more casting himself in the role of spokesperson for the public as 
consumers. The conclusions he draws from this claim, in terms of the ills of a form of 
music based upon the wishes of producers rather than consumers, are flawed on 
several counts, principally because of the model of consumer behaviour upon which it 
is predicated. Taruskin seems to have bought into the model of production being 
principally driven by and responding to demand – almost like the idea of the 
marketplace as a democracy – rather than supply and the creation of a demand, a 
model that I believe even most right-wing economists would not deny, 
notwithstanding the propaganda disseminated by their political representatives.  
 
Taruskin prefers assertive, even bullying, rhetoric to a throughgoing exploration of 
the implications of his positions such as, I believe, would reveal their own internal 
contradictions. But his writings on the subject remain of great importance, not least 
because of their faultlines which help to suggest other possible conclusions. 
Taruskin’s consumerist model, for the reasons I have described, is powerless to offer 
an alternative other than if one can believe in a listening community all made up of 
replica Taruskins- perhaps not the most edifying of visions. Otherwise he would need 
to fall back on some notion of false consumer consciousness in order to explain the 
success of objectivist performance. To do so would utterly undermine his own 
populism. But this is not a problem for the thoroughly non-populist Adorno. He is 
well aware as anyone of the complicity with and submission towards the ideologies of 
capitalism and other authoritarian systems as anyone. And this thinking permeates his 
1958 essay on Toscanini, ‘The Mastery of the Maestro’, which forms a continuum 
with his observations about consumer and audience behaviour as he identified above 
all in the United States. Crucially, he sees the rise of the figure of Toscanini as having 
its roots in a ‘recoil against the great personality’ together with ‘the first signs of an 
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allergic reaction to expressiveness as such’11, only to result in a reconstitution of the 
cult of personality, seemingly only existing for its own sake – ‘People believe in 
Toscanini so as to have something to believe in’12, rather like the grotesque 
phenomenon in today’s celebrity culture where some people are famous simply for 
being famous. Toscanini, to Adorno, created a streamlined type of performance, akin 
to the style found in circles around Stravinsky and the young Hindemith, one ‘based 
on machinelike impassivity and hostility to expression’13 in which all the inner 
tensions within the music are practically erased. This form of performance, entailing 
an ‘atomization into merely sensuous details’, which may be joined together, but 
never form themselves into some totality, Adorno associates with ‘the kind of 
atomistic listening associated more readily with the Culture Industry’14. And it is clear 
here and elsewhere that he has little respect for audiences who respond positively to 
such forms of music-making. The Toscanini that Adorno paints is of a similar breed 
to the objectivists who enact the historicist performances of Bach. Whether or not 
these win over audiences is not the issue for Adorno (though it should not be so 
surprising that one who was so acutely aware of the potential that fascism had for 
generating at least a measurable degree of popular support should thus be sceptical of 
populist arguments); rather it is the very untruth of the music itself, and its entering 
into an uncritical relationship with the most regressive tendencies of contemporary 
society. 
 
Minus these last aspects, Adorno’s critique of objectivism is very much at one with 
Taruskin’s writings on the work of Christopher Hogwood, Roger Norrington, and 
other primarily British protagonists in the historically-informed performance 
movement. But he is more circumspect in his comments on the work of Nicolaus 
Harnoncourt, Gustav Leonhardt, Reinhard Goebel and others from continental 
Europe, as I believe would have been Adorno had he lived to hear the bulk of their 
mature work. And this is where I believe Taruskin’s critique misses its focus: what he 
identifies as a characteristic of so-called ‘authenticist’ performance is really 
something more deeply rooted within performance traditions in Britain, a country 
which, despite leading the world in industrialisation and democratic institutions, never 
really had a proper bourgeois revolution such as would bring about a palpable shift 
from feudal to bourgeois subjectivity. One need only listen to recordings from the 
likes of Raymond Leppard and Sir Neville Marriner from the 1960s, and compare 
them with those of their period instrument-oriented compatriots from right afterwards, 
to discern how deep the similarities are. And whilst contemporary European HIP can 
similarly be shown to manifest a continuity with 1920s neo-classicism and Neue 
Sachlichkeit, there still remained in much of Europe other traditions of performance 
not explicitly at cross-purposes with late romantic traditions, which was not really the 
case in Britain to the same extent. Even the opposition between a Colin Davis and a 
John Eliot Gardiner does not have quite the same cultural and political significance as 
that between a Herbert von Karajan and a Nicolaus Harnoncourt.  
 
And it is in various of these European HIP figures that I believe one can find a more 
dialectical relationship with objectivist performing traditions. It is in this context I 
wish to suggest that there may be some possibilities of reconciliation between the 
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aesthetic ideals of performance of Adorno and those of, for example, Harnoncourt. 
This is where I will finally turn to Adorno’s thoughts expressed in TTMR.  
 
Adorno makes clear the purpose of his study, saying that: 
 
It is directed against 2 fronts. On the one hand official musical life, which – as is particularly evident in 
its most celebrated exponents – became part of the culture industry long ago: galvanized, spirited and 
culinary, all at the same time. Cultivated and barbaric music-making converge. On the other hand the 
front of abstract negation, the escape to the mensural realm. In the former case a false subjectivism, in 
the latter the residual theory of truth, the extermination of the subject (all forms of objectivism, from 
Stockhausen to Walcha, really amount to the same thing. . . 
 
Whilst Adorno makes it clear that he is opposed to the approaches of both 
Furtwängler and Toscanini, the very emphasis of the study shows a clear bias in favou 
of critique of the latter and all the associated objectivist tendencies, variously 
encountered in the work of Bruno Walter, and in certain ways Alfred Cortot and 
Arthur Schnabel. But the very seriousness with which he engages in a detailed reading 
of Frederick Dorian’s The History of Music in Performance demonstrates that the 
study of historical Aufführungspraxis is not a field which he would dismiss out of 
hand.  
 
Elsewhere Adorno alludes to the importance of the interpreter being able to break 
with their acquired habituality (which is nonetheless viewed as a necessary 
precondition for any interpretation) so that it can be ‘negated, and sublated by the 
specific insights arising from each work’ – with this in mind, he criticises Schnabel 
for not getting beyond the negation stage. The insistence on an active engagement 
with the specificity of individual works is a logical extension of his disdain for 
performing traditions that enact the very opposite by rendering individual works as 
relatively anonymous examples of genres – hence ‘They say Bach and mean 
Telemann’. This comment is notoriously unfair to Telemann, but if one substitutes the 
phrase ‘minor composers of generic baroque music’ for ‘Telemann’, then Adorno’s 
argument seems fair.  
 
What Adorno does not do in this incomplete study, but which I believe offers the 
potential for much fruitful future investigation, is attempt to integrate his readings of 
source texts on performance with these concerns. And this is where I would like to 
suggest a possibility that is not really considered in TTMR, but is not excluded either:   
that the very study of historical performance practice and its implementation can 
facilitate a framework for interpretation within which the identity of the specific 
insights of a work is made all the more pronounced. This would be an extension to the 
realm of performance of Adorno’s identification of the particular radicalism of those 
of Bach’s works inhabiting archaic idioms. And I would also link this argument to the 
convictions of Walter Benjamin on German Tragic Drama – by situating the theatrical 
works in their historical context, their dialectical relationship with that very historical 
and social structure is what enables them to project outwards into the present day. 
Benjamin was thinking primarily in terms of interpretation, but there is no reason why 
this argument cannot equally apply to performance and theatrical convention.  
 
Harnoncourt, in his writings on music, comes from a different angle, one which is 
drawn inexorably to pre-bourgeois music – specifically that preceding the French 
Revolution – but his diagnosis of the ills of the musical culture that has grown up in 
post-1789 times makes for an interesting comparison. 
 
[N]ow that it [music] is regarded as an ornament, it is felt that music should first and foremost be 
“beautiful.” Under no circumstances should it be allowed to disturb or startle us.  
 
Harnoncourt’s critique of the very nature of certain forms of cultivation of older 
music is directed against the same processes that Adorno would see as having been 
engendered by the Culture Industry: 
 
As I see it, this interest in old music – by which I mean music not written by our generation – could 
only occur as the result of a series of glaring misunderstandings. Thus we are able to use only 
“beautiful” music, which the present is unable to offer us. There has never been a kind of music that 
was merely “beautiful.” While “beauty” is a component of every type of music, we can make it into a 
determining factor only by disregarding all of music’s other components. Only since we have ceased to 
understand music as a whole, and perhaps no longer want to be able to understand it, has it been 
possible for us to reduce music to its beautiful aspect alone, to iron out all of its wrinkles. 
 
In an essay on Mozart’s orchestras, Harnoncourt draws attention the criticisms voiced 
by Hans Georg Nägeli of Mozart’s music, the apparent excessive love of contrast, 
Mozart being ‘both shepherd and warrior, sycophant and hothead . . soft melodies 
frequently alternate with sharply cutting tonal interplay, grace of movement with 
impetuosity. Great was his genius, but also great [were] his genial errors of creating 
effects through contrast’, and the music being ‘unartistic . . . when something can be 
made effective only through its opposite’. Harnoncourt in essence agrees with the 
attributes identified in Mozart by Nägeli, but the very things Nägeli saw as flaws 
Harnoncourt perceives as the strengths of the music. And it is the move away from a 
form of performance practice predicated upon the clear articulation of stark 
hierarchies that enables performers to make the music merely ‘beautiful’, or what 
Adorno would call ‘culinary’. Harnoncourt says that the tonal language of Mozart 
‘has been flattened, smoothed out, sweetened and harmonized in a way that cannot be 
explained on the basis of Mozart’s scores’, that we now have ‘a soft, full, dark string 
sound, with an admixture of the greatest possible number of dark-timbred wind 
instruments. The dynamics are undulating and not graduated; clarity and transparency 
are sacrificed to this sound and these dynamics’. The very attributes of the music thus 
being erased are part of Harnoncourt’s ‘specific insights’ – in this case focused upon 
articulation, timbre, dynamic gradations and other factors as much as harmony and 
counterpoint (of which Harnoncourt is no less aware but perhaps feels their 
importance to be more self-evident and less in need of verbal articulation), but no less 
specific to the works as a result. And what I hear in the best of Harnoncourt’s 
performances, of Bach, Mozart and others, is a type of rendition that stands at the 
opposite end of a spectrum from the clean-cut ‘objectivist’ style. Harnoncourt 
employs the continuous dialectical contrasts between material, and the tension created 
between the implications of individuated material and the sometimes rigid hierarchies 
within the structures and genres they inhabit, in the service of a vision, often dark, 
always dramatic, and far from leading to a tidy resolution of all tensions and erasure 
of experience by a work’s conclusion, that seems to find a way forward that sublates 
the Furtwängler-Toscanini opposition. It is also a very long way from, say, 
Norrington’s performances of Beethoven Symphonies criticised by Taruskin for 
reducing the Ninth in particular to nothing more than a ‘pack of notes’, shying away 
from the expressive potency of the work in favour of reinventing it as a variety of 
pure formalism. Taruskin contrasts this with an essentially Wagnerian view of 
Beethoven, whilst Adorno, and Harnoncourt, seem to reject both of these.  
 
This is just one example of a way in which a historically-informed approach might, in 
my view, be reconcilable with the rejection of earlier reified norms of performance as 
identified with Adorno – one which is, as Adorno puts it, ‘Against Furtwängler and 
Walter – and against Toscanini! And Karajan.’15. It is by no means the only way – 
Leonhardt’s forms of intensity generated as a precise result of austere aloofness, 
creating a sense of latency in a music that is forever contained within boundaries but 
yearning to escape them, or Reinhard Goebel’s exploration of the dialectic between 
aristocratic baroque genres inhabited by a more rustic, folk-like (though tremendously 
technically accomplished), style of playing, almost translating a form of class conflict 
into musical terms, would be others. And whilst demonstrating a degree of British 
reserve compared, say, to Harnoncourt, some of John Eliot Gardiner’s renditions of 
Bach, Beethoven and especially Schumann and Berlioz are of a quite different 
category to the culinary renditions produced Hogwood, Norrington, Pinnock and 
others inhabiting the British middlebrow musical establishment.  
 
Adorno’s specific insights into performance, some of them subtle and penetrating, 
provide a new and much-needed impetus for a developing discourse around 
performance that has become somewhat stagnant in recent years. Whilst not without 
their own serious problems – not least because of their insufficiently theorised 
conceptions of the role of the performer’s subjectivity, and a blindness to the 
possibilities inherent in employing objectivist modes of performance as one element 
amongst others in the course of a wider dialectic – they should not be seen as merely a 
hearkening back to some nostalgic realm of older High German cultural practice, nor 
as a kneejerk reaction against the multifarious world of historically-informed 
performance that has developed in particular since 1945. To bring his ideas into a 
dialogue with other thinkers on the subject of performance, and find ways of 
translating these ideas into actual performances themselves, can be an immensely 
fruitful way forward. 
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